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An overview of General Sir Harry Chauvel GCMG, KCB

Henry George (Harry) Chauvel was born on 16 April 1865 on a cattle station owned by his grandfather, a retired Indian army officer, at Tabulam, on the Clarence River in New South Wales; he was therefore forty-nine years old at the outbreak of war.

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Like all Australian country boys, the future cavalry leader was from his infancy associated with horses, and in the rough timbered ranges acquired that easy mastery of country which was always conspicuous in his control of operations. The fact that at Toowoomba and at the Sydney Grammar School he was not conspicuous as a scholar, was due perhaps to his thoughts running on sports rather than on studies.

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Small and light for his years and, even as a boy, a finished horseman, he was sought as a jockey at picnic or amateur race meetings in Queensland and New South Wales, where he rode with much success. From sport to soldiering is but a narrow step, and young Chauvel very early decided for himself upon a military career.

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Always an eager reader, he rejoiced in stories of battle; and one day at Damascus, almost at the end of the great cavalry drive which had given Palestine and Syria to British arms, he confessed that the two historical heroes of his boyhood were Saladin and Stuart, the great cavalryman of the American Civil War. “I never thought in those days,” he remarked, “that I should take part in a cavalry operation greater than anything undertaken by them.”

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He learned to manage the property on his father’s cattle station. Chauvel’s father, Charles Henry Edward Chauvel, a grazer and cattle breeder, was a Major in the militia and had raised his own unit, the Upper Clarence Light Horse, into which Harry was commissioned at age 21.

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He appeared on service as an almost anomalous product of a young country, where reserve is not nearly so marked in the individual man as it is in the older lands of the north.

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By the time of the Boer War, Chauvel was a Captain in the Queensland permanent forces. Chauvel served as a volunteer in the South Africa campaign with A Squadron of the Queensland Mounted Infantry. Reaching the rank of Major, he took part in the relief of Kimberly, the advance to Pretoria and the battle of Diamond Hill. At the crossing of the Vet River he personally captured a troublesome machine-gun. For a time he led a mixed force, known as Chavel’s Mounted Infantry, in operations in eastern Transvaal.

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Returning to Australia in 1901 he took command of a composite mounted force, the 7th Commonwealth Light Horse, which included Queensland, British, Canadian, and South African horsemen, but the war ended before he reached Durban. For his services in South Africa, Chauvel was appointed CMG and mentioned in dispatches; he was also given the brevet of Lieutenant-Colonel.

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Unlike many professional soldiers of distinction, he was always a leader of broad Imperial sympathies and infinite tact; and he displayed in that South African command, early in his career, the very rare capacity he had for handling men recruited from many lands and divided by striking differences of temperament and outlook. To this quality he owed his elevation later in Palestine to the command of Desert Mounted Corps, where, as the leader of a force of Australians and New Zealanders, British yeomanry, and Indian cavalry, he directed with complete success, and always without any apparent effort, one of the most complex and difficult corps commands to be assembled in warfare.

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In the next decade Chauvel established a reputation as a trainer, especially of officers; many who attended his staff rides were to distinguish themselves in World War I. Apart from a short period in South Australia reorganising the mounted troops, he remained in Queensland in staff appointments until 1911. He was one of the group, including (Sir) William Bridges and (Sir) Brudenell White, which was close to Major General Sir Edward Hutton, commander and organiser of the Australian Army in 1901–04. Chauvel was a strong supporter of the existing militia, and the organisation from 1910 of the compulsory system around its officers and non-commissioned officers owed much to his advocacy. On 16 June 1906, at All Saints Anglican Church, Brisbane, he had married Sibyl Campbell Keith Jopp; they had two sons and two daughters.

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Chauvel then served as Chief of Staff with the Northern Rivers District until 1911. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1909 and in July 1914 as full Colonel. In 1911 Chauvel became Adjutant General and second member of the Military Board. He was at the centre of affairs during the critical period when the compulsory system was being set up and the Royal Military College was being developed at Duntroon. This work was only partly completed when, in 1914, he was sent to London to be Australian representative on the Imperial General Staff at the War Office.

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By the time he and his family reached England, Europe was at war and Australia was preparing an expeditionary force. On his arrival he asked at once for employment in France, but was informed of Australia’s intention to recruit and send overseas a division of infantry and a light horse brigade, and told that he was required to command the mounted force.

Bridges chose Chauvel to command the 1st Light Horse Brigade; he was the only Australian regular, other than Bridges himself, to obtain a senior command in the original Australian Imperial Force. He served usefully at the War Office until he went to Egypt in December. His visits to Salisbury Plain had convinced him that the camps would not be ready for the AIF; his urgent representations to Sir George Reid, high commissioner in London, influenced the historic decision to disembark the force in Egypt.

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Chauvel joined the 1st Light Horse Brigade immediately after its arrival in Egypt, and, after directing its training, landed with his three regiments in Gallipoli in 1915.

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Chauvel served on Gallipoli as commander of the 1st Light Horse Brigade. Arriving on 12 May he took command of a sector that included Quinn’s Post, Courtney’s Post and Steele’s Post, each the scene of heavy fighting. He held these positions against all Turkish attacks until he was sent to a quiet sector in September. During that time, he became known for his coolness and courage especially in the critical fight of 29 May. Like Lieutenant-General (Baron) Birdwood, the corps commander, he spent much of his time walking his trenches and closely observing the state of his troops and their positions.

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Illness forced his evacuation and he spent June and July in hospital, returning to take command of the New Zealand and Australian Division in September 1915. Chauvel served with honour as a Brigadier, and on 6 November, 1915, was promoted to Major General with the temporary command of the 1st Australian Infantry Division.

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Anzac gave limited opportunities to generals, but it was nevertheless a severe test of leadership. The successful commanders were those who convinced the troops whom they led of their personal courage, their knowledge of their sector, their sense of the enemy, and their qualities as men. In that cramped area brigadiers and their troops lived close together. The men learned to know their officers very intimately, and an indifferent soldier or an unconvincing personality was quickly disclosed.

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He left the Peninsula with a reputation as a shrewd, safe leader, who had made the most of restricted possibilities. Birdwood was quick to appreciate his wide and intimate knowledge of tactics and the sound sure touch with which he applied that knowledge to actual warfare, and it was proposed that he should proceed with the infantry to France. But Chauvel shared with his light horsemen their strong desire for mounted action; and, when it was decided to leave Australia’s mounted regiments in Egypt, he elected, in a happy moment for his career and for British fortunes in the Near East, to remain and lead them.

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When, therefore, on 16 March, 1916, Chauvel hoisted his pennant at Anzac Mounted Division Headquarters at Serapeum, he must have regarded the future with much satisfaction. Almost every officer and non-commissioned officer, and more than half his men, had been through the trial of Anzac as infantry. The whole division was bursting with enthusiasm for a mounted campaign unconfined by trenches and barbed wire. Most important of all, perhaps, his men knew their prospective enemy. They had probed and discovered the Turk’s weakness and strength. They knew his straight shooting, his efficiency with the bomb rather than with the bayonet, his grim tenacity in defence, his fortitude under punishment, his capacity to make sound warfare under the harshest conditions and to endure on rations which would starve and destroy Western troops. They knew also his lack of personal initiative and his feebleness as an individual fighter in the open. Every Australian and New Zealander respected the Turk as a soldier; but every trooper felt his man-to-man superiority over the enemy.

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Chauvel, then, was well pleased with his division. But none of his staff officers would have guessed it. This remarkable Australian professional soldier, who was destined to become the greatest leader of horse in modern times, was one of the most imperturbable cavalrymen who ever crossed a saddle. No temporary failure depressed him; no victory, however sweeping and decisive, excited him.

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Given his choice of commands in Egypt after the evacuation, Chauvel took charge of the Australian and New Zealand mounted Division; in June 1916, he became the General Officer Commanding, AIF in Egypt, including the 1st Squadron, Australian Flying Corps; however, for virtually all matters other than operations, he was responsible to Birdwood in France during the rest of the war.

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The Anzac Mounted Division was from the day of its origin on the desert very fortunate in its leadership. General Chauvel, as temporary commander of the 1st Australian Infantry Division on the Peninsula, had already displayed qualities which marked him as a sound administrator and a wise and far-seeing Commander. Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Browne, his chief staff officer, an Australian native but a professional soldier of the British Army, had served in South Africa, and in 1914 was on the staff with Allenby’s cavalry during the retreat from Mons. Without exception the rest of the staff officers were men who had displayed marked ability in Gallipoli. Chauvel’s care and success in selecting his staff were proved, as the campaign progressed, by the fact that practically every officer on it rose rapidly and won distinction. The brigade staff were almost wholly officers tried in the Peninsula; so, too, were the leaders of the regiments and squadrons; many of them, perhaps a majority, wore South African ribbons.

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The new division was still settling down when on 23 April, the Turks raided the British outposts covering the northern approach to the Suez Canal. Chauvel immediately moved across the canal to restore the situation, beginning an advance which was to continue for two and a half years until the enemy was driven from Aleppo on the northern borders of Syria. His division was the only desert-worthy force in Sinai, so that when the second Turkish thrust for the canal was defeated at Romani on 4-5 August 1916, Anzac Mounted became the spearhead of Eastern Force in the advance across the desert into Palestine. At Romani, with only two of his four brigades under command, Chauvel outfought the Turks in blazing heat. He pursued them, but his division was too light a force to complete their destruction. Under Lieutenant-General Sir Philip Chetwode, commanding the newly created Desert Column, he destroyed Turkish garrisons at Rafa (December 1916) and Magdhaba (January 1917), thus clearing the way for an assault on the main Turkish positions around Gaza and Beersheba. After Magdhaba he was appointed KCMG.

Chauvel won the first decisive British victory of the war when he defeated the Turks at Romani, stopping their second attempt to reach the Suez.

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In the first battle of Gaza on 26–27 March 1917, Sir Harry Chauvel took advantage of the fog to place his division across the Turkish communications. He had forced his way into Gaza when he and the victorious British infantry were ordered to withdraw owing to the approach of fresh Turkish forces. In these operations, the newly formed Imperial Mounted Division was placed under his command. Immediately after the unsuccessful second battle of Gaza, 17–19 April 1917, Chetwode was given command of Eastern Force and Chauvel succeeded to the command of the Desert Column, thus becoming the first Australian to lead a corps. When General Sir Edmund Allenby became commander-in-chief in June 1917, he reorganized the army into three corps, giving Chauvel the Desert Mounted Corps of three divisions. In August he became the first Australian to attain the rank of Lieutenant-General.

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In Allenby’s offensive from 31 October 1917, Chauvel attacked Beersheba from the east. The troops of the Victorian 4th Light Horse Brigade fixed bayonets and launched a surprise charge on the Turkish trenches. This has entered Australian history as the last great cavalry charge of all time.

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Beersheba, a heavily fortified town 43 km from the Turkish bastion of Gaza, was the scene of an historic charge by the 4th Light Horse Brigade on 31 October 1917. Beersheba anchored the right end of a defensive line that stretched all the way from Gaza on the Mediterranean coast. The attack was launched at dawn on 31 October but by late afternoon the British 20 Corps had made little headway toward the town and its vital wells. Lieutenant General Harry Chauvel, commanding the Desert Mounted Corps, thus ordered the 4th Light Horse Brigade forward to attempt to secure the position. Brigadier William Grant responded by ordering light horseman of the 4th and 12th Regiments to charge at the unwired Turkish trenches. Employing their bayonets as “swords” the momentum of the surprise attack carried them through the Turkish defences. The water supplies were saved and over 1000 Turkish prisoners were taken. The fall of Beersheba thus opened the way for a general outflanking of the Gaza-Beersheba Line.

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After severe fighting Turkish forces abandoned Gaza on 6 November and began their withdrawal into Palestine. The Desert Mounted Corps, supported by the 60th Division, drove the Turks up the Plain of Philistia beyond Jaffa and the Nahr el Auja, and Jerusalem was entered by the infantry early in December. For his part in these successes, Chauvel was appointed KCB.

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In the reorganisation in the spring of 1918, a fourth division was added to Chauvel's corps, which now consisted of the Anzac and Australian Mounted Divisions and the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions. Allenby attacked twice across the Jordan during this period; the first operation was a powerful raid but the second, under Chauvel, was designed to seize ground with a view to advancing on the vital Turkish rail junction of Deraa. Doubting the feasibility of this plan with the limited forces and logistic support available, he made objections and obtained most of the 60th Division for the assault. Despite the rapid capture of Es Salt on 30 April, the battle swung against him. The Turks repeatedly repulsed the attacks of the 60th Division and drove in his left flank, threatening to cut off his brigades around Es Salt. Moreover, the promised aid from the Arabs did not materialise. As the Turks were being strongly reinforced, on 3 May he decided to withdraw, with Allenby’s gruff approval.

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The next offensive began on 19 September on the Mediterranean flank, with Chauvel’s corps poised to dash forward as soon as the infantry had cut a path through the Turkish defences. The secret movement of three cavalry divisions from the Jordan Valley to the orchards near modern Joppa was a triumph for Chauvel and his staff. Within twenty-four hours, by hard riding, his corps was positioned thirty to forty miles behind the disorganised Turkish armies, astride their communications and moving to seize the few crossings of the Jordan.

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The battle of Megiddo was one of the most completely successful operations of the war; only the Turkish army beyond the Jordan escaped the catastrophe and it was harried across the desert by the Anzac Mounted Division and the Arabs. Giving the Turks no time to recover, Chauvel destroyed their forces around Haifa and Lake Tiberias and made plans for the pursuit to Damascus; then having forced the passage of the Jordan north of Lake Tiberias on 28 September, he drove the enemy across the Golan Heights and rode for Damascus with two divisions while his third entered Deraa and drove the Turks northwards with Arab help. He entered Damascus on 1 October; after a short pause he was ordered to march on Aleppo, 322 km to the north.

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Aleppo fell to an Arab force on 25 October. There had been little fighting during the advance; this was fortunate, for Chauvel’s tired divisions were melting away, ravaged by malaria and typhus. Six days later the war in the Near East came to an end. In the five weeks since the opening of the offensive, the divisions of the Desert Mounted Corps had advanced from 483 to 804 km, taking over 78,000 prisoners and great quantities of booty. Their battle casualties were only about 650. Many reasons may be adduced for this overwhelming success but not the least was Chauvel’s planning of his successive thrusts, his co-ordination of his widely spread forces, and the special care that he gave to the logistical basis of all his operations. Although the headquarters of his polyglot corps was British, he had appointed to key administrative positions Australian officers of outstanding capacity. In 1919 he was appointed GCMG; he was also awarded the French Croix de Guerre, the Order of the Nile (twice) and was mentioned in dispatches ten times.

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Returning to Australia in September 1919, Chauvel was appointed Inspector General and made a member of the Council of Defence. In February 1920 advised the Government on the strength, organisation and equipment of the post-war army. Because disarmament and economisation were in the air the Government opted for a token force of 38,000 with six days of camp training a year.

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In these straitened circumstances Chauvel succeeded White as Chief of the General Staff in June 1923. At the Government’s request he continued to act as Inspector General. Chauvel’s reports of 1921–30 are not only a prime source of Australian military history but also his own testament. In plain, unambiguous terms he warned in report after report of the deterioration in Australia’s strategic position owing to the relative decline of British sea power; he cast doubt on the efficacy of Singapore as the first line of defence and he argued that the Army must be strong enough to hold out until help arrived. He also made it clear that the existing skeleton force of partly trained men was unfit to fight.

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In 1924 Chauvel pressed the Government for better training and pay for his men. He also sought to keep a close relationship with the British Army, by sending officers to the staff colleges and to the Imperial Defence College and on exchange duty in various British headquarters. Insistence on this policy prepared the more senior officers for their outstanding part in the Second World War.

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Although the Army obtained a few vehicles, the Army remained a force of 1918 vintage in which the officer corps struggled to keep up with British developments. Nevertheless, the foundations were laid, as in Army-Air Force co-operation exercises beginning in 1925, Chauvel’s own exercise for senior officers the same year, and the establishment in 1926 of the Defence Committee of which he was chairman until 1930.

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In his role as Inspector General, Chauvel frequently travelled the country to watch men in their training, which he preferred to paperwork and committee meetings.

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Like all true commanders, he drew strength and refreshment from contact with troops, and his long term as Inspector General gave him an unrivalled knowledge of the service. In October 1929 Chauvel was required to provide a plan for a smaller, voluntary force due to the economic crisis, which enlisted 25,000 volunteers in less than six months.

In November 1929 Chauvel was promoted General, the first Australian to attain this rank. His retirement next April was almost a national occasion; large public dinners were held in his honour in Melbourne and Sydney. But the only official recognition of his service was a ministerial direction for the provision of an army horse for his daily ride in the Melbourne Domain, a privilege he valued immensely.

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Retirement was for Chauvel a fruitful experience; directorships in three important companies gave him new interests and he now had time for ex-servicemen’s causes. He was for many years chairman of the trustees of the Australian and Victorian war memorials, a senior patron of Melbourne Legacy, and active in the work with the Victorian Blinded Soldiers’ Welfare Trust, YMCA, Toc H, and the Red Cross Society.

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When Roger Pocock, leader of the Legion of Frontiersmen, toured the country in 1935, he visited Melbourne and addressed a Legacy meeting hosted by Chauvel, saying that the men should join (which they did) and have Chauvel as leader.

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In 1937 Chauvel led the Australian Services Contingent at the coronation of King George VI. He represented the Returned Sailors’ and Soldiers’ Imperial League of Australia on the committee which drew up plans for reserve and garrison forces early in 1939. When the Volunteer Defence Corps was set up in June 1940, Chauvel became its Inspector-in-Chief. At 75 he was in uniform again and on the move around the country. When White, who had been recalled to be chief of the general staff, was killed in 1940, it was to Chauvel that the prime minister, Robert Menzies, turned for advice on a successor.

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In 1944 his health began to fail and he died in Melbourne in March 1945, survived by his wife and children. He was given a state funeral at St Paul’s Cathedral Melbourne. Sir Harry lived in Murphy St, South Yarra. He was a leading Anglican, having been a member of Synod for many years, representing Christ Church, South Yarra. He was a parochial nominator of Christ Church, as well as a member of its vestry. He was also for some years a lay canon of St Paul’s Cathedral.

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There is a bronze tablet to Chauvel’s memory in St Paul’s Cathedral, Melbourne, his sword is in Christ Church, South Yarra, and there is a memorial window in the chapel of RMC, Duntroon.

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After severing his long connection with the Army he became a director of the National Bank and of the Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society and chairman of the Australian board of the General Accident, Fire, and Life Assurance Corporation. He was a member of the Melbourne, Naval and Military, and Queensland Clubs, and also of the Cavalry Club, London.

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BELOW: Chauvel and his medals.

General Sir Harry Chauvel’s character and accomplishments

Chauvel’s interest in military affairs and in the welfare of returned soldiers was maintained throughout his career, and for many years he was a popular figure at the head of the Anzac Day marches in the city.

 

By his inspiration the Volunteer Defence Corps developed into an effective and well-equipped Home Guard, the value of which was generally recognised in the dark days when danger of a Japanese invasion hung over the Commonwealth.

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When addressing some of his men in 1923, at the unveiling of the Terang monument, Chauvel encouraged them to “stick with the League”, what is now known as the RSL. He promoted the interests of returned men, who regarded him as their peace time leader. Such work was but one manifestation of the religious faith on which his life had been built and which was recognized by his Church when he was made a Lay Canon of St Paul’s Cathedral, Melbourne, in 1930.

A very significant event occurred on 30 March 1938, when the ANZAC Day Commemoration Council resigned rather than put into effect a decision of the RSL to change the ANZAC Day service from a religious ceremony to a civic commemoration. The head and chief of this body was General Sir Harry Chauvel who was not disposed to deviate from the course he had indicated; the Shrine ceremony, he considered, should continue to have a deep religious significance. He could not conscientiously continue as chairman of the commemoration council if all spoken prayer was eliminated, and the ceremony changed from a religious to a civic commemoration.

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Sir Brudenell White also opposed the change, stated that he fully agreed with Chauvel and declined to lead the parade. Other Church leaders praised this stand, with Methodist G. A. Judkins saying “that men of Christian faith and others could not but admire the splendid courage of General Sir Harry Chauvel, and those who, with him, had refused to take a place of leadership in connection with a commemoration which deliberately repudiated Christ. The decision to eliminate essentially Christian features from the Anzac commemoration was nothing short of an affront to those thousands of people who mourned their beloved dead, and who could find no comfort apart from the Christian faith. What was even more serious was the definite tendency this act revealed towards the Paganising of national commemorations.” These and the comments of Anglican Archbishop Head were reported in The Age newspaper in April 1938. “Sir Harry Chauvel and Sir Brudenell White, have refused to be present at this ceremony, and we should follow their example.”

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Chauvel seemed shy and reserved, in Birdwood’s phrase “very retiring”, so that some found him aloof. In reality he was a warm, uncomplicated man, with a keen sense of humour. He rarely sent written orders of the day but he made a point of visiting and addressing troops who had done well or had suffered heavy casualties.

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Reserved and aloof in manner, gentle of speech and quiet of bearing, Chauvel won favour with the men of Anzac by his quality as a soldier rather than by his personal parts. He was not one of those leaders who went down among the men and gained their affection by active and sympathetic participation in their every-day lives. His aloofness did not mean that he was opposed to such conduct. He could not have done it if he had tried; he was far too shy. A keen but a very just disciplinarian, his manner was genial to officers and men with whom he came in contact; but he was incapable of seeking popularity either for self-gratification or for the legitimate purpose of stimulating in his troops a personal regard for their leader. Like many great military leaders who went before him, he was the sure far-seeing brain, rather than the spirit of his force. And so even in the great cavalry days ahead, when his huge corps of horsemen was rolling up the Turkish armies in Palestine, and victory was succeeding victory with the certainty of sunrises, he was never a hero to the light horsemen. Great leader as he became, he missed by his instinctive reserve the satisfaction of becoming a soldier’s idol.

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This was the more remarkable because Chauvel was a cavalryman. In the mounted service there is more hero-worship than in infantry. Most of the world’s great captains of horse have won their fame by the exercise at the critical moment of what is known as the cavalry instinct. They have been masterful, dramatic figures, who have leaped into fame by a brilliant stroke at the decisive time, seizing upon a fleeting opportunity to smash in with their horse and turn the fortunes of a hard-fought battle. Chauvel did so with his light horsemen at Beersheba. But that was after he had won his way to the greatest cavalry command of modern times. He was never an arresting, picturesque figure. There is no record in the whole of the Palestine war of him or any other general riding down a mass of Turks, sword in hand, at the head of his men. He earned his command by far-seeing and perfect preparation and exact execution rather than by inspired flashes of genius in times of crisis. Chauvel was no hard-riding gambler against odds. Like Alva, he could on occasion ignore the ardent enthusiasm of his officers and bide his time. Always cool, and looking far enough ahead to see the importance of any particular fight in its proper relation to the war as a whole, he was brave enough to break off an engagement if it promised victory only at what he considered an excessive cost to his men and horses. He fought to win, but not at any price. He sought victory on his own terms. He always retained, even in heated moments of battle, when leaders are often careless of life, a very rare concern for the lives of his men and his horses.

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Chauvel’s appreciation of the true purpose of mounted riflemen was illustrated again and again in his command of the light horse. In scouting, patrol, and reconnaissance, the functions of mounted riflemen are identical with those of cavalry, but in action their work is quite dissimilar. When engaged in actual operations, they are infantrymen made highly mobile by their horses. They are thrusters and raiders; they are intended for swift surprise work on the flanks rather than for frontal attack. Their mission is by bold reconnaissance to screen preparation and the advance in battle, daringly to probe and discover the enemy’s strength and intentions, constantly to keep him uneasy as to his flanks and all the while prepared to swoop down on an exposed enemy position, or by long night-rides to surround and destroy his isolated posts. Their superior merit as dismounted fighters lies in the speed of their approach to an enemy force or stronghold, and — as they have not been exhausted, like infantry, by long marches under burdensome packs and arms and munitions — in the freshness, vigour, and rapidity of their subsequent advance on foot. This mobility gives them strong chances of frequently surprising and overwhelming enemy forces greatly superior to their own. The light horsemen were usually outnumbered in their fights in Sinai and Palestine. Such enterprises have their obvious risk. If the enemy in a selected position survives the first onslaught of his swift-striking assailants, he has a sound opportunity, if the attack is persisted in, of destroying most of the mounted infantry force. And mounted men in warfare are, with their horses, slower to train and more difficult to replace than ordinary infantry. Had the Anzac Mounted Division, for instance, been disabled in the early days of the Sinai campaign, it is extremely doubtful if Palestine would have fallen to British arms.

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Chauvel never lost sight of these elementary principles in the employment of his mounted rifles; and it is to be remembered that, for more than a year after the crossing of the Canal, true cavalry, as distinct from mounted rifles, played little or no part in the campaign. His disposition was to make all possible use of his force, but never to risk its extinction except, of course, when fighting on the defensive, as at Romani. He was a leader of infinite patience. A deep student of military history, he was never in a hurry to win expensively to-day that which could be won cheaply to-morrow. In the bold aggressive ranks of cavalrymen such a policy was at times certain to be challenged by criticism; Chauvel’s justification lies not only in the magnitude of the results achieved by his mounted forces in the campaign, but in the trifling battle casualties which his victorious horsemen suffered.

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As a soldier, Chauvel’s courage and calmness were matched by his humanity which was extended to the enemy as well as his own men. He was always well forward in battle; in the field he lived simply, sleeping in his greatcoat on the sand when his force was on the move. Loyalty was one of his chief characteristics: he stood by Birdwood when Allenby tried to interfere with the AIF command, and by the New Zealanders when there was an attempt to make Anzac Mounted wholly Australian.

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The funeral of Chauvel in 1945 was presided over by Archbishop J. J. Booth. At his funeral service, the Archbishop based his eulogy on Paul’s words to Timothy, “Be ye a good soldier of Jesus Christ. A workman that needeth not to be ashamed.” He pointed out the frequency of military metaphors in the New Testament, for good soldiering and Christian qualities are akin and they were conspicuous in the career of General Sir H. Chauvel. Four features were noteworthy, viz., loyalty, courage, discipline, comradeship. The practice of these made Sir Harry one of whose life’s there was no need to be ashamed but rather on to be emulated. The Archbishop said he was a great soldier and a convinced Christian. Eight Generals served as pallbearers.

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Sir Robert Menzies said Parliament in 1945, “Indeed, it has been said, and said by those competent to judge, that, in the military sphere, Sir Harry Chauvel was one of the most remarkable cavalry leaders of all history. In addition, we recall air Harry Chauvel, the man, because, with all the capacity for decision, the force of character and the strength of mind that must have informed his military actions, he was in private life a man of the greatest simplicity, of the most exquisite courtesy, and of direct, honest and attractive character. Indeed, although they were not physically similar, I could not meet him without being reminded by his manner, and that which was inside him, of the late General Sir Brudenell White. This country is, indeed, fortunate to have produced out of the turmoil of war, on two or three occasions, such amazing servants of the people.”

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BELOW: Chauvel meets the Queen in 1937 (with HRH Princess Elizabeth present).

Chauvel and the ANZACs from a Christian chivalry perspective

Harry Chauvel’s own battle pennant was identical to the flag of the Order of St John of Jerusalem. He carried a Bible bound in wood with a Crusader’s cross carved into the cover. The Light Horsemen’s motto was reminiscent of passages in Isaiah: “In the desert we have written our names.”

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When advancing into Palestine, the official history records that when they could see Jerusalem, “even those who were not animated by religious fervour were stirred by the sight of what was to every man the deeply significant goal of his endeavour.”

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The official history also records, “Nebi Samwil, the Mizpah of the Old Testament, the Montjoye of the Crusaders, marked the limit of King Richard’s forlorn advance in January, 1192. Although the soldier is usually careless of the associations of the country over which he is fighting, these troops took a remarkably close and intelligent interest in the battlegrounds of the Old Testament and of the Crusaders. All or nearly all the Christian troops had during the long campaign diligently read their Bible as they had never read it before, and were arrested by the amazing fidelity of its atmosphere and colour. Guide-books of the Holy Land were studied in detail and read aloud round every camp-fire; and there were few among the soldiers who were not moved by the tragedy of the Lion Heart’s failure, or who did not make a sporting resolution to carry, after the lapse of 700 years, Richard’s mission to a triumphant conclusion.”

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So far from the modern reinterpretation of the larrikins diggers in an anti-imperialist and anti-Christian narrative where they were mere cannon-fodder for bungling British “brass”, the true history shows quite the opposite. Mateship and Anzac were not secular concepts as has been commonly asserted, but chivalric and Christian ones.

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The Melbourne Shrine of Remembrance quotes from the King James Bible, on the very centre stone around which the whole structure is based, “GREATER LOVE HATH NO MAN”, to which any Christian would mentally supply the rest of the verse, “Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” These words of Jesus did not merely mean the sacrifice for fellow citizens, but implied that the best soldier was a true Christian, and his fellow soldier was one too.

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The Australian War Memorial officially asserted that in fact the Anzacs were the vanguard of Australian Chivalry. The Light Horse in particular had campaigned victoriously on old crusader battlegrounds. This was no coincidence. The Australian soldiers were inspired by a high sense of honour, disdain of danger and death, compassion for the weak and oppressed and self-sacrifice. These qualities are embodiments of chivalry. The spirit of the old knights was now perpetuated in their descendants, the Australians.

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A grand new Order of Chivalry had been established by Australian men at arms. From all grades of society came Paladins to champion the cause of peace-loving people whom they believed to have been wantonly assailed by the enemy.

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In the 1933 book entitled Australian Chivalry, the title page bore an image of a knight in armour on one side, and a calm digger. The slouch hat had replaced the crested helm; the sombre khaki tunic the coat of mail; the bayonetted rifle the sword and lance. But with enthusiasm as lofty as that of any knight of old, these young men swore fealty to the oppressed against the despoiler, and from that pledge, voluntarily given, they were not to be diverted by pain, peril or privation. They were warriors in modern dress.

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The Digger was presented as the descendant of the knight crusader. Australian chivalry is a spirit which links the Australian warriors of recent days to their heroic English forebears. They were the noble embodiment of chivalry.

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The Anzacs were part of a greater godly war effort engaged with the Eastern Antichrist, the Turk and the rising menace of Russia. Centuries of conflict with Islam was written in the British psyche, which the Australians inherited. Turkey was seen as a sick man, and taking the capital Constantinople should have been easy. The idea was the take that city before the more serious threat could take it — Russia. However, the attempt to capture Constantinople bogged down in Gallipoli, so the forces were withdrawn, and efforts were taken to capture Palestine.

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However, the Turks doggedly resisted the British forces, holding them at bay in southern Palestine. Assaults onto Gaza had failed, so the Light Horse were called upon the ride out into the desert and attack Beersheba from the flanks.

Hundreds of Light Horsemen attacked Beersheba, and the Turks fled. Light Horsemen are nothing more than mounted riflemen. They were soldiers who only rode horses to transport them to a fight, so their cavalry charge onto the armed Turks at Beersheba is highly unusual. G. W. Lambert’s painting The Charge of the 4th Light Horse Brigade at Beersheba shows the bloody close quarters action.

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The decisive battle at Beersheba and the consequential liberation of Palestine have been viewed as key steps in both Jewish and Christian history, and as an important step in fulfilling an Old Testament prophecy about the demise of the Turkish Caliphate in 1922, some 1290 years after the first drive of Islam across the Middle East in 632. In another 45 years Jerusalem was in the hands of the Jews in 1967.

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BELOW: Chauvel’s battle pennant.

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